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Race, Colorblindness, and 
Continental Philosophy 
 
Michael J. Monahan* 





The “colorblind” society is often offered as a worthy ideal for individual 
interaction as well as public policy. The ethos of liberal democracy would 
seem indeed to demand that we comport ourselves in a manner completely 
indifferent to race (and class, and gender, and so on). But is this ideal of 
colorblindness capable of fulfillment? And whether it is or not, is it truly a 
worthy political goal? In order to address these questions, one must first 
explore the nature of “race” itself. Is it ultimately real, or merely an illusion? 
What kind of reality, if any, does it have, and what are the practical (moral 
and political) consequences of its ontological status? This paper will explore 
the issue of colorblindness, focusing particularly on recent developments 
dealing with this topic in Continental philosophy. Beginning with the question 
of racial ontology, I will argue that race has a social reality that makes the 
practice of colorblindness, at least for the time being, politically untenable, 
and it may remain suspect even as a long-term goal. 
 
Race continues to be a central feature of the North American 
political landscape. To be sure, no small amount of ink and rhetoric 
have been spent attempting to deny the significance, and even reality, 
of race, but even this effort serves as evidence of its ongoing 
importance. The fracas surrounding the governmental and media 
responses to Hurricane Katrina alone should make this point 
abundantly clear (indeed, we might say that in North America, even 
“natural disasters” have racial significance). In keeping with the liberal 
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democratic ideals of meritocracy, one response to the continued 
political significance of race has been to call for “colorblindness.” 
This approach construes race as “color,” and color as irrelevant to 
issues of justice. In other words, something so insignificant as one’s 
pigmentation should be irrelevant to questions of the distribution of 
social goods (broadly construed). The intuitive and rhetorical appeal of 
this response to race should be obvious to anyone who came of 
political age in North America. This is consistent with the rhetoric of all 
men being created equal and judged by the content of their character. 
But what are the ultimate merits, theoretical and practical, of the ideal 
of colorblindness? Is there a plausible account of a colorblind society 
as an ideal toward which we ought to aim, and does this ideal offer 
any concrete strategies capable of bringing that dream of 
colorblindness to fruition? In order to even begin to address these 
questions some account must be offered of the ontological status of 
race itself. One cannot argue for or against the disavowal of race 
unless one knows exactly what it is that one is (or is not) denying. 
Philosophers in the Continental tradition have recently taken up these 
questions, and in doing so have offered some crucial insights. 
Beginning with the ontological question, this essay will survey some of 
the recent efforts of philosophers working within the Continental 
tradition(s) to deal with the issue of colorblindness. In addition to this 
survey of the literature, I will offer my own position both on racial 
ontology and on the question of colorblindness. 
 
Is Race Real? – The Question of Ontology 
 
The issue of colorblindness is deeply informed by the question of 
the ontology of “race” itself. That is, what sort of thing is race? Is it 
something that is built-in to the natural world (i.e., biological)? Or is it 
something “socially constructed”? Is it real, or merely a conceptual 
tool used historically for nefarious ends? The answers to these 
questions will have an enormous impact upon the kinds of responses 
one can have to the ideal of colorblindness. If one believes, for 
example, that race is a real biological fact, then “colorblindness” 
becomes a kind of selfdeception.1 If, on the other hand, race is in 
some strong sense non-existent or illusory, then “colorblindness” is 
neither more nor less than simple accuracy as regards the facts of the 
matter. If race is not real, then acting as if it is irrelevant is no more 
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problematic than conducting oneself as if the ancient Norse pantheon 
were irrelevant. Any exploration of the question of colorblindness 
should thus begin by mapping out the landscape of “racial ontology” 
before confronting colorblindness directly. Just what is it that we ought 
or ought not (can or cannot) to ignore? 
Traditionally, the way to approach the ontological question is 
through an appeal to scientific methodology. This can be especially 
felicitous, since the history of the concept of race (see Harris; Zack, 
Bachelors of Science) is replete with efforts to demonstrate the 
“scientific” reality of racial differentiation by using everything from 
phrenology to the Bell Curve (see Herrnstein and Murray). According 
to this approach, if race exists, it is as a real, biological fact.2 There 
must be observable differences in phenotype that are localized to 
specific breeding populations.3 In the absence of such observable (and 
ultimately quantifiable) facts, race cannot be said to be real. Of 
course, the technological developments associated with genetics in the 
twentieth century have provided a new arena in which to wage the 
debate concerning race. Rather than looking at easily observable 
differences in appearance (skin color, hair texture, etc.), it is now 
possible to “map” the DNA of individuals and measure the extent to 
which “race” can or cannot be said to be a biological fact, or to look at 
the DNA sequences of specific individuals and describe their racial 
membership(s) without ever setting eyes on the actual person. The 
kinds of justifications and categorizations based upon gross 
morphology that held sway in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
have been replaced by more sophisticated conceptions predicated 
upon the analysis of genetic variation between and within populations, 
and this shift has produced some very interesting results. 
There is mounting evidence that no scientific foundation for the 
concept of race can be found within the human genome. Kwame 
Anthony Appiah has argued persuasively that the scientific/biological 
justification for race is specious, and that race ought to therefore be 
understood as “illusory”. Appiah points out in particular that the 
percentage of genetic variation between individuals within a given 
“race” can be greater than that between individuals from different 
“races.” Without any clear correlation between racial membership and 
particular sequences of DNA, Appiah concludes that race is not real, 
and should therefore be abandoned as a means for classifying 
individual human beings. On the other hand, Philip Kitcher, a 
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philosopher of science, has argued for the “biological significance” of 
race (114). We might take, for example, the recent evidence that has 
suggested that certain pharmaceuticals will have varying efficacy 
depending upon the race of the recipient as evidence for this 
“biological significance” (see Villarosa). Kitcher admits that the 
resultant notion of race is not nearly as “thick” as the traditional one 
(that is, it doesn’t have anywhere near the breadth of social, cultural, 
moral, and political content as the “folk” conception of race), but there 
is room to hold that it is real, nonetheless. The debate rages on, and 
the proverbial jury may still be out when it comes to the biological 
reality of “race.” The question that emerges from this debate, 
however, is whether there can be good reasons for affirming or 
denying the “reality” of race regardless of the underlying biology. In 
other words, there may be a suspicion that a purely biological 
approach may be too limited, and here is where philosophers working 
within the Continental tradition have made their greatest contribution 
to the question of the ontology of race. 
If there is a possible biological foundation for some conception 
of race, it seems clear, as Kitcher suggests, that it has only a passing 
resemblance to the popular (and historical) use of the term (109–10). 
If one rejects reductionist materialistic accounts of human reality 
(which seems common to most “Continental” approaches to 
philosophy), then biology alone cannot settle the question of racial 
ontology. That is, to assert that the absence of an underlying biological 
reality proves the non-existence of race assumes that reality is the 
sole purview of the natural sciences. But this is a proposition that 
Continental philosophy, since Hegel, has rejected. Thus, even if one 
grants that Kitcher is correct, the “race” which he claims has biological 
significance is simply not the same thing as the “race” which has been 
used to justify chattel slavery, genocide, Jim Crow, and continuing 
manifestations of systematic oppression and exploitation. The latter 
concept has often tried to use biology in efforts to lend itself 
legitimacy, but in the end the biological and cultural concepts are only 
cousins, and not ultimately the same thing. By the same token, the 
“illusory” status of race, biologically speaking, might not, on its own, 
rule out the cultural “reality” of race. Without a robust correspondence 
between biological evidence and the more common understanding of 
race, the rejection of the former in no way entails the rejection of the 
latter, nor does the affirmation of the former entail the affirmation of 
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the latter. At stake in all of this is the question of the nature and scope 
of “reality” itself. It is not enough simply to say that race is real or 
unreal without first making clear how one’s conception of “real” 
functions in this context. 
If the correspondence between biology and our actual 
experience of race is tenuous at best, then it makes sense to focus our 
investigation on the nature of that experience itself – in other words, 
we should make a phenomenological turn. Naomi Zack (“Race, Life, 
Death”) has argued from the perspective of existential phenomenology 
(drawing on her predecessors Martin Heidegger and Simone de 
Beauvoir) for a rejection of the reality of race. According to her, “race” 
simply is not a brute fact of nature, but rather it “is the result of 
complex myths and social fictions that form a powerful cultural reality” 
(100, emphasis added). This “cultural reality,” according to Zack, 
emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a way to justify 
the brutal treatment of African, Asian, and (Native) American peoples 
in a manner that openly contradicted the dominant humanistic political 
theories of the time. “Race,” therefore, has existed, and continues to 
exist, but only as a convenient political/cultural tool of exploitation. We 
must, if we are to successfully deal with racial oppression, make clear 
that the underlying concept lacks scientific reality, but possesses an 
all-too-potent cultural reality. 
With this analysis in mind, according to Zack, we find further 
that from any particular individual’s perspective, racial identifications 
(the ways in which we are identified racially by other individuals) are 
always imposed upon us from the outside. Consequently, it is up to us 
whether we choose to incorporate those identifications into our 
particular identities (the ways in which we understand ourselves) – we 
decide whether to make the racialized ways in which others perceive 
us (identifications) part of who we are as individuals (identities). Given 
that racial identifications exist only as tools for oppression and 
exploitation, to incorporate those identifications into our individual 
identity, Zack claims, amounts to a self-imposed constraint upon our 
freedom. In affirming a racial identity, according to her, we are 
willingly taking up externally imposed identifications whose historical 
provenance and present day functions are saturated with oppressive 
meanings. It is tantamount to choosing to be deprived of freedom. 
She argues that we must “purify” ourselves of racial identifications if 
we are to realize our full potential as free human agents (105). This is 
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an account of the ontological status of race with clear implications for 
the question of colorblindness. 
For Zack there is a sharp distinction between race as such, 
racial identities, and racial identifications. The existence of the latter 
two categories is independent of the existence of the first. Zack denies 
the existence of races as a biological fact, but in no way denies that 
there are racial identifications (imagining what it would take to 
sincerely deny that racial categories are employed by other human 
beings is extremely difficult) from which the “cultural reality” of race 
emerges. And racial identities, as options open to any given agent, 
also clearly exist, whether the (biologically) “real” races to which they 
refer exist or not. Furthermore, Zack holds that racial identifications 
and identities must be challenged (for example, by refusing to employ 
racial terms in one’s own identity and by openly contesting attempts 
by others to identify one in racial terms) in the hope of one day 
eliminating them. Thus, Zack offers a moral/political argument for the 
repudiation of racial identifications and identities, predicated upon her 
rejection of the biological reality of race itself. 
Zack’s account allows for a certain kind of reality for race, but it 
is one that is ultimately reducible to the collected identifications of 
others, which in turn sets the context in which we choose our 
individual identities. This is effectively a kind of elimitavism (a 
rejection of the reality of race), inasmuch as what little reality this 
view grants to race is always already a mistaken one. Race is “real” as 
a cultural reality, but only because we falsely take it to be real in the 
more important, biological sense. There seems to be operant within 
Zack’s account two kinds of reality: the really real, which has to do 
with the facts about race revealed by the natural sciences, and then 
there is the merely culturally real, which has to do with our beliefs 
about the really real. Zack’s prescription for rejecting race (and 
purifying our identities) cannot be understood as the elimination or 
destruction of a real (biological) category, but rather must be 
conceived of as an affirmation of and witnessing to a lack of reality. In 
short, it seems that the conflation of reality as such with the natural 
sciences continues to operate within Zack’s argument. 
Another common approach, and one which grants a more robust 
status of “reality” to race, is to understand it as a “social construct.” 
On this view, race exists as a real, though socially contingent and 
context dependent, category. There are rules for racial designation 
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that are culturally specific, and may vary over time, but at a given 
time and in a given place, one’s racial designation cannot be purely 
subjectively determined. One can, in other words, not only be wrong 
about the ascription of racial membership to others, but also to 
oneself. To be sure, these rules for racial designation may be vague in 
various ways (as the growing literature on “mixed race” will attest),4 
and differ from place to place and time to time, but in general, claims 
about racial membership have a real truth value in relation to the rules 
of racial designation within that specific context. In this way, they 
have a degree of objectivity – my race is not simply up to me. Charles 
Mills has offered one of the best articulations of this general view, 
which he refers to as “racial constructivism” (47). Some Continental 
philosophers of race have sought to provide an even more robust 
theoretical account of race as this kind of “constructed” reality. 
In his first major work, Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, Lewis Gordon 
used Sartrean existentialism (and especially the concept of “bad faith” 
from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness) to provide just such an account 
of racial reality. Bad Faith, at its heart, is a kind of self-deception – 
a flight from responsibility and from one’s freedom.5 Sartre offers 
numerous examples, but in general bad faith takes the form of an 
attempt to convince oneself that one is either completely determined 
by one’s situation or that one is completely independent of that 
situation. The applications of this Sartrean concept to race are quite 
useful. The racist sees her value and the value of others as determined 
by racial membership. She is virtuous, intelligent, or trustworthy 
because she is White, while they are none of those things because 
they are Black. But what does Sartrean bad faith tell us about racial 
ontology? 
One crucial aspect of Gordon’s account for the present purposes 
is his distinction between what he refers to as “strong” (individual) and 
“weak” (institutional/social) bad faith (Bad Faith 45–8).“Strong” bad 
faith in a racial context is the individual choice to view oneself as 
either completely separate from one’s racial situation (pure 
transcendence), or as completely determined by it (pure facticity). The 
latter might take the form already mentioned in which one sees 
oneself as inherent virtuous simply as a result of being White (in which 
case one is not responsible for that virtue). The former might take the 
form of a denial of the role that race, or the history of racism, has 
played in one’s life. It is “strong” because it is manifest in a particular 
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individual, and targets a specific group or individual. “Weak” bad faith, 
on the other hand is more diffuse. It may be understood as a kind of 
“background milieu” which supports, fosters, and legitimates the 
“strong” bad faith of particular individuals. Its “weakness” lies not in 
the fact that it is somehow a lesser manifestation of bad faith (as we 
shall see, the opposite is often more accurate), but in the fact that it 
cannot be specifically pinned down or located in any particular 
individual or set of individuals. To avoid confusion, I will refer to this 
latter form of bad faith as “institutional.” 
In order to see more clearly how institutional bad faith functions 
in relation to individual (“strong”) bad faith, take, by way of example, 
the informal segregation of housing markets. The institutional bad 
faith in this example would be the ways in which racial demographics 
correspond to housing values, interpretations of the dangerousness of 
a given neighborhood, the perceptions of those neighborhoods by 
larger institutions such as media, law enforcement, government, 
business, and so on. Any individual agent acting within this milieu can 
appeal to these different manifestations of institutional bad faith in 
order to avoid explicitly acknowledging or confronting his or her own 
individual bad faith. The real estate agent isn’t racist, he is simply 
responding to the desires of his clients. The potential buyer isn’t racist, 
she is simply responding to the “realities” of the market. In short, the 
normative claims and assumptions made by individuals can be cloaked 
in a vast array of “built-in” symbols, meanings, and norms, while each 
individual act of bad faith within this context serves only to further 
entrench and legitimize this background. Thus, individual and 
institutional bad faith are dependent upon and influence each other. 
Individual manifestations of bad faith generate institutional bad faith, 
and institutional bad faith in turn inculcates, legitimates, and 
reinforces institutional bad faith. 
Race itself can thus be understood as a manifestation of 
institutional bad faith. Its reality is a matter of its symbolic and 
interpretive power. Racial statements, racial terms, racial identities, 
racial analyses, and so on all have meaning only within that context of 
institutional bad faith. And this is, importantly, independent of any 
particular individual will. To illustrate this point, I’ll use the example of 
communication. Suppose I have a habit formed in my youth in rural 
Indiana of using the word “boy” as a term of endearment (“Boy, you’re 
crazy!” or “That boy can shoot some serious pool”), and that I intend 
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only to communicate familiarity and affection by its use. But if I apply 
that term to a Black man, the meaning is fundamentally altered in a 
way that is real, and independent of my intent. This change in 
meaning is a matter of a shift in the racial context in which it is 
employed. Racial reality in other words has impinged itself upon my 
communicative practices in a way that will doubtless have real 
consequences for me and my interlocutor(s). This reality, in turn, is 
strictly a matter of the collected history, formal and informal rules, and 
symbolism (in short, the milieu), that give race the meaning it has in 
this time and this place. Thus the concept of race itself, as a kind of 
background milieu of bad faith, is contingent upon, but something 
more powerful than, the choices and beliefs of individuals (precisely 
because the choices and beliefs of individuals are conditioned by and 
interpreted through the structures of this background of bad faith), 
and that is the source of its reality. 
None of this is to say, however, that race is independent of 
human beliefs or actions. Race could not exist, even as institutional 
bad faith, without human beings undertaking the kinds of actions, 
choices, and interpretations that give meaning and power to it. But at 
the same time, the content of race as a concept is not simply up to the 
choices or beliefs of any particular individual. Indeed, one could argue 
that any individual denial of racial reality would be a further 
manifestation of bad faith, in that it evades the ways in which race 
conditions one’s own life and one’s interactions with others. If I deny 
that I am White because I believe that races are ultimately illusory, or 
nonsense, or otherwise less-than-real, then I am rendering myself 
blind to the ways in which Whiteness operates in my life (both 
positively and negatively). To treat all people, including myself, as if 
race didn’t exist is effectively saying that it is truly irrelevant, which is, 
from this Sartrean perspective, a convenient way to avoid taking 
responsibility for one’s racial position. It is analogous to simply 
denying that one is American when traveling abroad because 
“American” is merely a social construct. One can contest the reality of 
race, but one cannot in good faith deny it outright, even if its reality is 
socially contingent. It is more than simply the sum of individual beliefs 
(identifications), because it is partially responsible for those beliefs. 
Part of what motivates the racial elimitavists is the very 
laudable goal of challenging racism. From their perspective, racism, 
which is undeniably real, is predicated upon (mistaken) beliefs about 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Philosophy Compass, Vol 1, No. 6 (November 2006): pg. 547-563. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
10 
 
the biological reality of race. If those beliefs can be disproved, then 
the proverbial rug will be yanked out from under racism. The implicit 
claim here is clearly that race is logically prior to racism. The 
existentialist approach offered by Gordon argues that this claim is 
mistaken. It isn’t that the racist discovers races and then attaches 
normative content to racial categories after the fact. Rather, the bad 
faith of racism generates races, and employs that concept to 
legitimate the racist’s social and political aims. This is not to say that 
racism is logically prior to race either. They are co-dependent 
moments in a very complex and convoluted social phenomenon with a 
long and rather murky history. The institutional bad faith of race relies 
upon individual manifestations of bad faith for its continued existence, 
but those individual manifestations are only possible (and intelligible 
as racist) within the context of institutional bad faith that gives them 
meaning and power in the first place.6 What must be stressed, 
however, is that this insistence on the reality of race brings with it a 
rejection of the logical priority of race over racism. The claim – that 
eliminating or rejecting race ontologically will undermine racism as 
a social phenomenon – treats these two things as distinct in a way 
that cannot be sustained. 
Before turning to the question of colorblindness, another 
possible response to some of the approaches to racial ontology should 
be explored. Specifically, I would like to examine the distinction 
between race and ethnicity. Linda Martín Alcoff has approached this 
issue by paying specific attention to Latina/o identity in North America, 
and with a particular emphasis on the way in which visible signifiers of 
race (and gender) play a vital role in identity construction and 
expression.7 “Race,” she allows, is understood both to be a 
questionable biological category and also to be homogeneous. But 
neither of these claims about race apply very well to the case of the 
peoples of Latin America.8 Ethnicity, on the other hand, “builds on 
cultural practice, customs, language, sometimes religion, and so on” 
(“Is Latina/o Identity a Racial Identity?” 315). It is supposed, in other 
words, to be more explicitly cultural and less biological. One could 
argue, therefore, that race is not real, but ethnicity is real, and the 
confusion is a matter of conflating race with ethnicity. But this 
particular response is inadequate, Alcoff argues, inasmuch as ethnicity 
in North America has been “racialized.” She states: “[Latinas/os] have 
been shut out of the melting pot because we have been seen as racial 
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and not merely cultural ‘others’ ” (331). Attempts to portray a 
particular group as “ethnic” rather than “racial” have been thwarted, in 
other words, by the persistence of racial identification on the part of a 
dominant group (in this case “whites” or “Anglos”), who continue to 
constitute a collection of individuals (from Latin America) as a race 
that is fundamentally “other. ”The force of race, according to Alcoff, 
emerges along four axes: the color axis, the physical-characteristics-
other-than-color axis, the cultural-origin axis, and, in the cases of 
Asian Americans and Latinos, “nativism” (Visible Identities 259). 
The position of Latinas/os in North America is such that they are 
persistently racialized along all four of these axes, she contends. To be 
sure, the visible axes are most pernicious and most potent, but racial 
reality does not simply reduce to these visible signifiers so readily 
(259). Race is thus something impossible to simply explain away. 
Alcoff contends that for all its contingency and cultural specificity, race 
“dogs our steps” (“Is Latina/o Identity a Racial Identity?” 332), and 
exerts a kind of ontological force that can only be confronted, never 
evaded. Rather than offering a plausible means to deny the reality of 
race, the study of the intersection of race and ethnicity actually further 
demonstrates the reality and potency of race, in that race has, in this 
case, effectively taken over an ethnic category. 
At this point the importance of these ontological issues for the 
question of colorblindness should be readily apparent. Even if there 
should be some kind of biologically justified notion of racial 
membership, it could not correspond directly to the dominant 
cultural/political use of the term both historically and in the present. 
Whatever supports the notion of race, it is not, and has never been, 
good science. The question of colorblindness, therefore, must of 
necessity revolve around the kind of reality race might have beyond 
the purely biological. If one could reject the reality of race altogether, 
then colorblindness would most definitely be a viable ideal. To hold 
that race is contingently real, however, need not obligate one to reject 
the ideal of colorblindness. It may very well be desirable to work to 
bring about a world in which race is no longer real, even if it happens 
to be real at the present. In addition to attending to the ways in which 
one’s ontological positions impact the question of colorblindness, it is 
also important to explore the way in which one’s approach to the 
question of colorblindness informs one’s ontological positions. When 
the ontological positions are so contentious, and so underdetermined 
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by biological science, the plausibility of those positions may have more 
to do with one’s intuitions regarding colorblindness than anything else. 
That is, if my political intuitions are strongly sympathetic to 
colorblindness, then I am more likely to be persuaded by elimitavist 
arguments. I am not claiming that one’s ontological position is 
determined by one’s political views in this case. Rather, my point is 
that when there is a lack of decisive evidence one way or the other, 
one is likely to be more readily persuaded by those arguments which 
are most consistent with one’s political views. Just as one’s ontological 
position impacts one’s take on colorblindness, one’s position on 
colorblindness can impact one’s view of racial ontology. In what 
follows, it will be important to bear this reciprocal relationship between 




Given the variety of positions on racial ontology, what is the 
best way to approach the question of colorblindness? There are two 
distinct, though interrelated, dimensions of this question. The first has 
to do with the function of colorblindness as a practice. Given the 
current racial climate, is colorblindness even possible for any given 
individual? Furthermore, if it is possible, is it indeed the best way to 
resolve the political problems that arise within a context that 
pervasively “sees” race? The second dimension has to do with 
colorblindness as an ideal toward which our racial politics ought to 
strive.9 Would a racially just society necessarily be a colorblind 
society? These two questions are distinct insofar as one could 
consistently hold that colorblindness is inadvisable as a current 
practice, but nevertheless aim toward colorblindness as an ultimate 
ideal for racial justice. As was the case with racial ontology, 
contemporary Continental philosophers have taken a variety of 
different positions on these questions. 
Given Naomi Zack’s rejection of race altogether, it seems to 
follow that she would endorse colorblindness both in practice and as an 
end goal. “A racialized person,” she states, “cannot effectively resist 
racism from within a racialized identity” (“Race, Life, Death” 104). Of 
course, this does not mean that one should pretend that others do not 
identify one as a particular race nor does it mean that one must refuse 
to take into account how others tend to be identified racially. Our 
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identity, according to Zack, is the way in which we understand our own 
selfhood and agency, and thus to incorporate external identifications 
used to enforce and legitimize systematic oppression and exploitation 
into our identity is to choose to cripple that agency. “Racialized 
persons,” Zack concludes, “have to remove from themselves external 
identifications about their biology and culture which would, if 
incorporated into their identities, be impediments to their agency” 
(105). This rejection of racialized identity is not, Zack stresses, the 
same thing as “wanting to be white,” however. If the rejection of 
racialized identity is understood as wanting to be white, then 
whiteness would be nothing more than the absence of racialized 
identifications. Whiteness, in this sense, would therefore just be the 
absence of race, and as such would be a laudable goal for anyone 
(106). A desire to be white could also be a desire for racial privilege 
(or at least a mitigation of racial disadvantage), or a desire to assume 
the role of oppressor, and in this sense it would merit moral 
disapprobation. The difference is that one understanding of whiteness 
equates it with a racial position of superiority while the other equates 
it with a lack of racial identification altogether. The former is a further 
manifestation of racism that Zack rejects, while the latter is a kind of 
colorblindness that she endorses. 
Thus, for Zack, “race” exists as nothing more than a long-
standing and powerful myth used to justify practices of exploitation 
and oppression, and the goal of liberation is in part to arrive at a 
future in which race becomes a meaningless concept. The goal, in 
other words, just is colorblindness. At the same time, Zack holds that 
this goal cannot be reached so long as individuals continue to accept 
racial identifications as part of their identity. We can “see” color as 
something that is imposed upon ourselves and others, but this 
imposition must ultimately be rejected – and most especially it must 
be “purged” from our subjective identity (I can recognize that I am 
identified in a racialized way, but I must never accept that 
identification when I construct my identity). Our acknowledgement of 
racial identification, therefore, should extend no further than an 
explicit critique and rejection of that identification. Beyond that, we 
should be “blind” to race. Any acceptance of race into our identity, 
even if it is intended as a challenge to racialization, only serves to lend 
credence to the myth of race. Thus, Black Pride is ruled out, even 
though it is an effort to challenge racist oppression, because it accepts 
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racial categories even as it tries to alter their normative content. 
Freedom, Zack contends, is race-less, and thus a commitment to 
human freedom, both as an ideal and in practice, requires 
colorblindness in the here and now as a rejection of racialization. 
Zack’s position is tenable, however, only if one accepts her 
effectively elimitavist position. If one holds that race has a reality 
beyond mere the third person ascriptions of racial identification, then 
colorblindness becomes self-deception, rather than liberation. What is 
more, Zack seems to understand “identity” as entirely self-determined 
– she offers a hard and fast distinction between external identifications 
and internal identities. But what if this distinction is not so neat and 
clear, or perhaps even collapses altogether. The distinction between 
self and other has been a frequent theme of Continental philosophy, 
and it is often the target of critique. Even Sartre, in his later works, 
understood the self to be deeply and inescapably conditioned (though 
not determined) by the larger social context into which it is thrown. 
Indeed, if we take the earlier discussion of institutional bad faith 
seriously, we can see the way in which this external” context 
conditions my subjective intentions, meanings, and actions in ways 
that are not necessarily consistent with one’s intentions. In short, this 
makes Zack’s project of “purifying” one’s identity incoherent from the 
start – which in turn renders her prescription of colorblindness, at least 
as a current practice (if not as an ideal), highly problematic. I will turn 
now to a thinker who has addressed exactly this issue. 
In her book Witnessing: Beyond Recognition, Kelly Oliver 
explores the question of colorblindness in light of her critique of the 
politics of recognition (147–68). Oliver opens her discussion of 
colorblindness with a critique of the visual metaphor that preserves a 
hard distinction between subject and object. By presuming that 
individuals are at complete liberty to choose whether or not to see 
some aspect of the world around them, the rhetoric of colorblindness 
“denies and ignores the affective implications of seeing race in a racist 
society” (159). By way of example, she points out that well-
intentioned people may often equate racial “colors” (white and black) 
with non-racial colors (green and purple), in claiming, for instance, 
that they do not care whether someone is black, white, green, or 
purple. Such a formulation “denies the social significance of color and 
the history of racism by treating socially meaningful colors on par with 
colors without a social history and meaning” (159). By making this 
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rhetorical equivocation, and portraying the reality of race as something 
individually chosen in the act of voluntarily seeing different “colors,” 
racism is reduced to a purely individual (as opposed to social) 
problem. The injustices of racism thus become the result of those 
misguided individuals who choose to see races (instead of seeing “just 
human beings”), and the socially institutionalized aspects of racism 
can thus be ignored (160–1). This has the further result of dismissing 
not only acts of racism but also experiences of racism as 
manifestations of paranoia or self-serving appeals to victimhood 
(playing the “race card”). Oliver’s point is that race has a reality that 
resists individual efforts to see or not see it (largely, she argues, 
because the visual metaphor itself is misleading and should be 
abandoned), and so colorblindness cannot be an adequate response to 
that reality. Ultimately, Oliver argues, “Colorblindness is a symptom of 
racism” (166). By reducing racism to individual weaknesses and 
pathologies, and then enjoining those individuals to simply refuse to 
“see” race, the all-too-real social manifestations of racism are left 
wholly unchecked. 
It seems clear from her discussion of colorblindness that Oliver 
rejects it as a current practice. The answer to problems of racial justice 
is not to render oneself blind to difference and reduce individuals to 
featureless social atoms. Rather, according to her,  
 
working-through the pathology of racism requires “seeing” and 
embracing the responsibility for the ability to respond – the 
responsibility to witnessing and witnessing subjectivity – even 
and especially in our blind spots. (168)  
 
In other words, our relations with others need to take our real 
differences, whether they be biological or social, into account if we are 
to take seriously the agency of another not merely as abstractions 
(any person), but as concrete particular agents (this person). In other 
words, race inevitably conditions our identities, and to attempt to 
ignore this fact is to blind ourselves to its influence in ourselves and 
the world around us. Thus, rather than striving as much as possible to 
“not see” race, we ought rather to attend closely to the ways in which 
we do “see race,” and the ways in which this racial vision impacts our 
own lives and the lives of others.  
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Lewis Gordon makes a similar point when he points out that 
colorblindness, and political liberalism in general, make a critical 
mistake when they attempt to overlook otherness as such. 
“Otherness,” he points out, is a category shared by all “selves. ”The 
problem with racism is not that it treats certain individuals as if they 
were other, but rather that it treats certain individuals as if they were 
sub-other (Existentia Africana 85). Colorblindness in practice, 
therefore, becomes an evasion of an important “social reality,” the 
impact of which “is ontological; it transforms concepts – knowledge 
claims – into lived concepts, forms of being, forms of life” (84). This 
social reality cannot, according to Oliver and Gordon, be altered by 
turning a “blind” eye toward it. 
Colorblindness in practice, accordingly, must be rejected. First, 
if one rejects the claim that race is logically prior to racism, then 
simply refusing to acknowledge races will not challenge racism or 
eliminate its pernicious effects. Second, if who we are as individuals is 
not radically distinct from our social context and if our social context is 
deeply racialized, then ignoring race amounts to a kind of (often 
convenient and comforting) self-deception. So what ought we to do if 
the immediate practice of colorblindness is rejected? Foremost, it 
should be noted that the recognition or acknowledgement of the reality 
of race does not entail the endorsement or affirmation of that reality 
(at least not in its present form). That is, one can accept that race is 
real and powerful without accepting that it ought to be real (or ought 
not to have this character) or exert this kind of power. This means that 
rather than comporting oneself in a manner consistent with 
colorblindness, one ought to instead work to make racial reality and its 
functioning explicit both individually and institutionally. This would 
include insisting on the historical and contingent character of that 
reality. The institution of race functions at once to give race reality and 
power and to obscure the nature of that reality and power. Opening 
these operations to scrutiny would not eliminate them, but it would 
compel people to take an explicit stance in relation to them.10 In other 
words, in striving to understand and openly confront the reality and 
function of race in ourselves and in our institutions, we do more to 
challenge racism than we could if we practiced colorblindness. 
Of course, these analyses do not offer decisive responses to the 
issue of colorblindness as an ideal. Even if colorblindness should turn 
out to be ineffective as a means for achieving racial justice, it might 
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nevertheless be possible to conceive of the ideal state of racial justice 
as one in which race itself is no longer seen, precisely because it either 
has ceased to exist altogether (if one understands its reality to be 
socially contingent), or because it has lost its political/cultural 
significance (if one understands its reality to be in some way socially 
independent). 
On the one hand, one might argue that any actual racially ideal 
state would be one in which race, whether it still exists or not, could 
not function in any way similar to the way it presently functions. In 
other words, even if we continued to “see race,” it would not be the 
same races, with the same “forms of being, forms of life” as we 
presently understand them. It might function in the same way that we 
“see” insignificant physical differences in the present. That is, the 
difference between being one race or another might be understood in 
the same way that I can see that Bob has thicker hair than Phil. In a 
world in which hair-thickness has no political or moral relevance 
whatsoever, we can still recognize differences in hair-thickness; they 
are just not relevant unless we are shopping for hair product. From 
this point of view, race would function, in an ideal state, in exactly the 
same way. We would “see” differences in pigmentation, facial 
structure, and so on, but they would utterly lack the significance that 
they presently possess. One way to understand this condition would be 
as “race-less,” and the people in this state as “colorblind,” even 
though there might still be “races” in some purely descriptive sense, 
and people could still see “color” in the same way that they see any 
number of politically insignificant physical differences. Whether or not 
this can be understood as “colorblindness” becomes merely a matter of 
semantics. 
On the other hand, even if the ideal state were one in which the 
political and moral significance race were dramatically different, a case 
might be made that colorblindness would not and ought not to be the 
functional norm. This is a matter of the degree to which one takes race 
to be a significant aspect of identity, and is related to discussions of 
the extent to which racial assimilation is actually a process of 
“whitening.” It depends, in other words, upon whether one believes 
that the ideal state of racial justice would be one in which there were 
no racial identity whatsoever. The underlying idea is that one might 
want to preserve racial notions of identity even in conditions where the 
current political/moral significance of race is nil. This view is in part 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Philosophy Compass, Vol 1, No. 6 (November 2006): pg. 547-563. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
18 
 
motivated by the worry that identity in a “race-less” world would be a 
de facto white identity. The proponent of colorblindness might point 
out that if race were truly insignificant in the political arena, then what 
would be the point of incorporating it into one’s identity? This in turn 
raises the question of the role of history. In this hypothetical future 
state, there may not be a racial landscape politically, but one certainly 
would have existed in the past, and my racial membership would 
situate me in relation to that history in a manner that could be 
significant for my identity. One can see this view informing Frantz 
Fanon’s desire to “assert” himself not as a human being in the 
abstract, but “as a BLACK MAN” (114–15), and in Sartre’s description 
in Anti-Semite and Jew of the liberal “democrat” as one who “saves 
the [Jew] as man and annihilates him as Jew” (56). From this 
perspective, the proponent of colorblindness as an ideal is assuming a 
sharp distinction between history and identity in order to prescribe a 
race-less identity, despite a long history of significant racial difference. 
If one rejects that distinction, then the case for an ideal of 
colorblindness becomes less appealing. 
Both of these responses, however, take for granted the idea 
that the goal of our actions in response to racism can properly be 
understood as an end state at all. Is race, in other words, something 
that can ever be completely laid to rest, put behind us, or otherwise 
understood to be over and done with? Is “racial justice” properly 
understood as an end state to be achieved? A strong case can be 
made that it is not. Consider, by way of example, the explicit 
admonition to “never forget” the Nazi Holocaust. To be sure, anti-
Semitism remains a serious problem both in North America and 
elsewhere, but the argument is not that we ought to remember the 
Holocaust so long as anti-Semitism persists, but that we ought never 
to forget. The remembrance, therefore, is not understood as a 
conditional means to some ideal end state, but rather as an important 
and on-going project. Our actions and interactions must continue to be 
understood in light of the events of the mid-twentieth century, or else 
we run the risk of missing some of the significance of those actions 
and interactions. We can never, in other words, arrive at some end 
state in which the Holocaust may be forgotten. Similarly, one might 
argue that we ought not to become “blind” to race, no matter how 
ideal our society may become, for similar reasons. The significance of 
race, or the Holocaust, may change over time, and may even be 
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reduced, but it remains a hugely significant feature of our history, both 
as individuals and as a society, and perhaps this significance should 
always be remembered. This argument is linked in important ways to 
the argument offered by Oliver and Gordon that colorblindness in 
practice obfuscates certain important aspects of social reality. The 
complacency that would come with colorblindness as an ideal state 
would make conditions ripe for a surreptitious return of racism – for 
any given individual in a situation where race is no longer seen, it 
would be difficult to recognize the (re)emergence of racism should 
people begin to stray from the ideal. 
If colorblindness is rejected both in practice and as a political 
ideal, what then ought we to be envisioning as a blueprint for racial 
justice? Though a fully adequate response to this question is beyond 
the purview of the present essay, I would offer some modest 
suggestions. First and foremost, the idea that racial justice can be 
understood as an end state or a finite goal must be abandoned. Racial 
justice is about how we interact both on an institutional and an 
individual level. As such, it requires not a single plan or prescription 
but an ongoing process of negotiation, renegotiation, critique, and 
reform. This will require us to take race seriously as we attempt to 
root out its effects on our own identity, on the identity of others, on 
our religious, cultural, and political institutions, and in our histories. On 
an institutional level, this requires not just blindness to color, but a 
critical sensitivity to the reality of race and its impact on issues of 
justice. By “critical sensitivity” I mean not a passive acknowledgement 
or affirmation, but a public recognition that can, when it is warranted, 
challenge the present state of affairs or interpretation of history. On 
the individual level, what is required is exactly the same sort of critical 
sensitivity. I cannot pretend that race has had no impact on my life, 
nor can I simply accept that impact as if it were a law of nature. I 
cannot pretend that race has no influence over the way I interact with 
others from the same race or from different races, but neither can I 
simply accept this influence as inevitable and immutable. 
We need, in other words, to openly contest those aspects of 
racial reality that are unjust, but not to deny that reality altogether, 
nor condemn it in toto. In practice, this can range from challenging 
racist jokes to pointing out a racial bias in news reports to organized 
political action. One ought to neither accept nor deny racial reality, 
and one’s efforts to challenge that reality ought to be performed in 
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such a public way that they invite others to confront racial reality as 
well. Through this constant process of openly contesting racial reality, 
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1. Of course, it is a separate move from the biological reality of race to the 
imputation of any normative content to that reality. That is, it is one 
thing to say that there are White people, and another thing entirely to 
say that White people have specific moral, intellectual, or political 
virtues as Whites. 
2. In such a case, saying that there are White people is akin to saying that 
there are birds. Both are broad categories of biological description into 
which individuals may or may not fit. Some creatures are birds, some 
creatures are not. Some people are White, some people are not. 
3. This is true only since the shift from what Ernst Mayr has referred to as 
“typological” thinking (which makes an original appeal to innate 
characteristics essential to a particular species as such), to 
“population” thinking (which begins with the observation of unique 
individuals and generalizes from those individuals to particular 
species). A definition of race, for example, based upon genetic 
variation across relatively discreet populations, would be a 
manifestation of “population thinking.” See Mayr 38–47; Smedley 
303–10. 
4. For example, see Kwan and Speirs. 
5. In addition to Sartre and Gordon, see also Schroeder 221–8; Bell 26–47. 
6. The significance of this can be seen by means of a thought experiment. 
Suppose one were to behave in a manner typical of a virulent racist 
toward a target that is not, in any typical sense of the term, 
oppressed. Let’s say, for example, that Steve truly hates engineers, 
and wishes to see them rounded up and confined to reservations. 
Steve could shout anti-engineer slogans, deface the homes and offices 
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of engineers, distribute anti-engineer literature on campus, and so on. 
How would Steve’s actions impact the engineers he targets? How 
would they impact engineers as a group? How would the general public 
understand Steve’s position and actions? It seems clear that the 
answers to these questions are strikingly different in this case than 
they would be if Steve were an anti-black racist carrying out an anti-
black agenda. And that is because the larger social context lends a 
power and meaning to the racist’s actions that are absent when Steve 
simply decides that he hates engineers. That is the difference that 
institutional bad faith can make. 
7. Alcoff, “Is Latina/o Identity a Racial Identity?”; Visible Identities 179–204; 
“Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment.” This latter 
anthology is a particularly rich resource for treatments of race and 
racism within a broadly “continental” context.  
8. Indeed, the exact boundaries of “Latin America,” the understanding of who 
counts as being properly from Latin America, and what to call such 
people, are all hotly contested. See Gracia 1–43, 88–129. 
9. For example, the journal Race Traitor states that it is working “toward the 
abolition of Whiteness.” See the editorial “Abolish the White Race” 9–
14. 




Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Is Latina/o Identity a Racial Identity?” Latin American 
Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values, and 
the Search for Identity. Eds. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Elizabeth Millán-
Zaibert. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004. 313–34. 
——.“Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment.” Race. Eds. Robert 
Bernasconi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001. 276–83. 
——. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. New York: Oxford UP, 
2006. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “The Illusions of Race.” African Philosophy: An 
Anthology. Ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998. 275–90. 
Bell, Linda A. Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity. Tuscaloosa, AL: The U of 
Alabama P, 1989. 
Bernasconi, Robert, ed. Race. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New 
York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967. 
Gordon, Lewis R. Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1995. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Philosophy Compass, Vol 1, No. 6 (November 2006): pg. 547-563. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
22 
 
——. Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought. New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2000. 
Gracia, Jorge J. E. Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2000. 
Harris, Leonard, ed. Racism. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999. 
Herrnstein, Richard J. and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and 
Class Structure in American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
Ignatiev, Noel and John Garvey, eds. Race Traitor. New York: Routledge, 
1996. 
Kitcher, Philip. “Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture.” Racism. Ed. Leonard Harris. 
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999. 87–117. 
Kwan, SanSan and Kenneth Speirs, eds. Mixing It Up: Multiracial Subjects. 
Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 2004. 
Mayr, Ernst. The Growth of Biological Thought. Cambridge, MA: The Balknap 
Press of Harvard UP, 1982. 
Mills, Charles W. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell UP, 1998. 41–66. 
Monahan, Michael. “The Conservation of Authenticity: Political Commitment 
and Racial Reality.” Philosophia Africana 8.1 (2005): 37–50. 
Oliver, Kelly. Witnessing: Beyond Recognition. Minneapolis, MN: U of 
Minnesota P, 2001. 147–68. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Anti-Semite and Jew. Trans. George J. Becker. New York: 
Schocken Books Inc., 1948. 
——. Being and Nothingness. New York: Gramercy Books, 1956. 
Schroeder, William R. Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 
Smedley, Audrey. Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a 
Worldview. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. 
Villarosa, Linda. “Conversations With: Joseph Graves; Beyond Black and 
White in Biology and Medicine.” New York Times Jan. 1, 2002. 
Zack, Naomi. Bachelors of Science: Seventeenth-Century Identity, Then and 
Now. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1996. 
——. “Race, Life, Death, Identity, Tragedy, and Good Faith.” Existence in 
Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. Ed. Lewis R. 
Gordon. New York, NY: Routledge, 1997. 99–109. 
